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G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States
G.L. Christian and associates v. US (375 U.S. 954, 84 S.Ct. 444, 11 L. Ed.2d 314 (1963)), is a 1963 United States Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) court case which has become known as the Christian Doctrine. The case held that standard clauses established by regulations may be considered as being in every Federal contract. Because the FAR is the law, and government contractors are presumed to be familiar with the FAR, a mandatory clause that expresses a significant or deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy will be incorporated into a Government contract by operation of law, even if the parties intentionally omitted it.〔 "If a mandatory clause that implements fundamental procurement policy is omitted from the contract without a deviation, it is included in the contract by operation of the Christian Doctrine" "...legal rule providing that clauses required by regulation to be included in government contracts will be read into the contract whether or not physically included in the contract, unless a proper deviation from the regulation has been obtained...The Christian Doctrine should not...be read to mean all procurement regulations have the force and effect of law, it applies only to those regulations that impact a fundamental procurement policy.〕
==Case background==
The Army Corps of Engineers signed a contract with G.L. Christian and Associates to build 2,000 housing units for soldiers at Fort Polk, Louisiana, under the "Capehart Act". Fort Polk was deactivated by the Department of the Army in 1958, and the $32.9 million construction contract was terminated by the Corps of Engineers on February 5, 1958. The contractor responded to the cancellation by submitting claims for costs incurred, settlement expenses, and lost profits. The Dept. of the Army attempted to settle these claims in accordance with the standard “termination for convenience of the government” clause outlined in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR). Under this clause, the contractor could claim a profit allowance for work it already had performed, but not for anticipated profits. However, the company argued that because the Army had failed to include this termination for convenience clause in the contract, the Army's cancellation of the project constituted a breach of contract. The contractor claimed that it thus was entitled to common-law damages for breach, including anticipated profits.
An "unusual feature of the case" is that G.L. Christian and Associates were not negatively affected financially in any way by the termination of the Fort Polk contract. G.L. Christian and Associates attempted to assign the entire contract to Zachry and Centex, two "highly competent construction companies with extensive experience in large scale-enterprises" but the Department of the Army took the position that a housing contract under the Capehart Act could not be assigned to another company. At a later conference though, it was agreed that the contract would be transferred to Zachry and Centex with a subcontract by G.L. Christian and Associates. Zachry and Centex became the "''de facto'' prime contractor". After the deactivation, Zachry and Centex sued in the name of G.L. Christian and Associates because they had no privity of contract with the Federal Government, and it could not sue the government in its own name.〔
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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